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DEFAULT, ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES
UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 9 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
WILLIAM

B.

DAVENPORT*

INTRODUCTION

In November 1966, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code-noting, among other things, that 47 of the
54 sections of Article 9 of the Code had been non-uniformly
amended and that some 337 such amendments were in
force-appointed a special Review Committee to restudy Article 9
in depth.' In April 1972, the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the
two organizations responsible for drafting the Code) published the
final version of the work product of that Review Committee: the
1972 Official Text of Article 9 (referred to herein as "Revised Article
9").2 Illinois promptly became the first state to enact Revised Arti*

Member of the Illinois Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his

associate, Peter A. Flynn, in the preparation of this article.
The substance of this article will be a chapter in a forthcoming practice handbook on
secured transactions under Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which is to
be published by the Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law
Institute and the American Bar Association, 4025 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.
1. REPORT No. 3 OF THE PERMANENT EDrrOIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE iX-Xi (1967). The Review Committee completed its work in October 1970 and submitted its report to the Permanent Editorial Board. In February 1971, the Permanent Editorial
Board accepted the report with some amendments. The resulting Final Report of the Permanent Editorial Board, published under date of April 25, 1971, was submitted to the American
Law Institute in May 1971 and to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in August 1971. Each organization made minor changes which were approved by
the other.
2. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT AND COMMENTS OF ARTICLE 9 SECURED TRANSACTIONS. This is a buff-colored softcover text. Part I thereof contains the 1972 Official Text
and Comments of Article 9 Secured Transactions (in its entirety) and related sections (1-105,
1-201(9) and (37), 2-107 and 5-116). Part II thereof contains the 1972 Official Text showing
the changes made in the former text of Article 9 and in related sections and the reasons for
the changes. Both parts also contain an Article 11, which contains an effective date and
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cle 9, to become effective on July 1, 1972.3 As of this writing, Arkansas, Virginia and North Dakota have become respectively the second, third and fourth states to adopt Revised Article 9.4 It is anticipated that the 1972 Official Text will be enacted by many of the
legislatures of the remaining 47 Code jurisdictions during 1973.
The "restudy" of Article 9 by the Review Committee, as is
apparent from even a cursory reading of the 1972 Official Text, was
indeed "in depth." It produced extensive amendments to Article 9,
both by way of substantive changes and in the form of clarifications
of the prior text.'
The purpose of this article is to consider the present status of
Part 5 of Article 9, which deals with the enforcement of security
interests, and the rights and remedies of both debtors and secured
parties, on default. In general, the basic provisions of Part 5 of
Article 9 seem to have worked reasonably well. Revised Article 9
makes few changes in Part 5. The changes made, however, are important; more important still are recent judicial developments concerning two major aspects of the Article 9 default provisions: the
constitutionality of the basic "self-help" provisions of Section 9-503,
and the remedies available to debtors against secured parties who
fail to comply with the disposition provisions of Sections 9-504 and
9-505.
transition provisions for the application of Revised Article 9. The text of Article 11, prepared
by the Reporters, has not been approved by the drafting organizations and is submitted as a
working draft only.
In June 1972, the entire Uniform Commercial Code was republished as the 1972 Official
Text. It, of course, incorporates all previous amendments to the Code approved by the Permanent Editorial Board and not merged into the 1972 Official Text of Article 9. All citations in
this article to the Code, including the Official Comments, are to be the 1972 Official Text
unless noted otherwise.
3. Ill. P. L. No. 77-2810 (Sept. 8, 1972). See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26 (1973 supp.).
4. 4 C.C.H. SEc. TRANs. GUm, Report Letters #103 (Feb. 20, 1973); #106 (April 3, 1973);
#107 (April 19, 1973).
5. The 1972 Official Text completely rewrote two critical sections-9-103, concerning
choice of law in multiple state transactions, and 9-313, concerning fixtures. It added 9-114,
concerning filing to safeguard the interest of a consignor in consigned goods (even where the
consignment is not a security interest) and 9-408 (dealing with financing statements covering
consigned or leased goods). It also amended - extensively in many cases - 27 of the 54
sections of former Article 9. In some instances - as with 9-503 and 9-504, discussed below the very decision not to amend a particular provision itself indicates a strong substantive
comment. Revised Article 9 has already generated substantial commentary. Much of it is
catalogued in Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REv. 477, 482-83 nn.20 & 21
(1973).
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I.

THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF PART 5 OF ARTICLE

9

Rights upon default, of course, are the essence of the rights of
a secured creditor. They distinguish him from an unsecured creditor
by according him the ability to proceed immediately against property earmarked for payment or performance of an obligation!
To be sure, one might gain a contrary impression of the importance of the default provisions of Article 9. The subject matter of
default is usually deferred until the last-in Article 9 itself, in security agreements, in texts and even in seminars and institutes on
Article 9. Naturally, the consequences of default are the last things
that any party to a secured transaction wants to consider, and the
default itself the last thing that any party wants to happen. It has
been well said that a secured party "who at the outset of a transaction purposely plans a definite foreclosure upon the collateral is
usually either a knave or a fool." 7 Defaults do happen, however, and
the whole purpose of a secured transaction is to insure that the
creditor will not find himself without an enforceable remedy if default in payment or performance of the underlying obligation should
occur. As a practical matter, thought must be given to the possibility of default, and the consequences which attach to it, at the outset
of any secured transaction.
Part 5 of Article 9 renders that thought process extremely important by substituting flexibility in default procedure (in general
subject only to the test of "commercial reasonableness") for the
rigidity and complexity of default procedure under pre-Code chattel
security law, and, except for the limitations stated in Section 9501(3), permitting the parties to establish whatever default procedure they feel appropriate in the particular transaction! On default,
a secured party may take possession of the collateral (Section 96. The word "immediately" must be qualified where the debtor is a subject of a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act; but even in such situations, the secured creditor is entitled to special treatment in the bankruptcy court. He cannot be lumped with the conglomerate mass of unsecured creditors.
7. Hogan, The Secured Party And Default Proceeding Under The UCC, 47 MINN. L.
REv. 205 (1962). Professor Hogan adds, "Assuring repayment of indebtedness, and not realization upon the collateral, is the main object of any sensible lender." Id. Professor Hogan's
article is an excellent, detailed analysis of the earlier text of Article 9 and of pre-Code and
early Code decisional law. The present writer, while drawing upon Professor Hogan's organization of the subject matter, emphasizes the developments which have occurred since the
appearance of his article. That article retains, however, considerable validity, and is well
worth consulting.
8. Id. at 207-08.
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503), and thereafter sell it or lease it or otherwise dispose of it
(Section 9-504), or keep it in satisfaction of the underlying obligation (Section 9-505), or in appropriate cases, such as where the
collateral is accounts or chattel paper or commercial paper, simply
collect it (Section 9-502). If the collateral is documents, the secured
party may proceed either as to the documents or as to the goods
covered by the documents (Section 9-501(1)). Additionally, the secured party may, although in most cases he need not, "reduce his
claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure" (Section 9-501(1)).
Ihis broad variety of possible default procedures reflects not
only the basic freedom-of-contract tenet of the Code (expressed in
Section 1-102(3)), but also the desirability of providing sufficient
alternative methods of disposing of collateral to allow maximum
realization on each of the wide variety of types of collateral in which
security interests may be created. For example, goods, negotiable
documents (or the goods they cover: see 9-501(1)) and investment
securities will normally be sold in order to realize their maximum
value; the preferred method of sale, depending upon circumstances,
may be either public sale at auction or private disposition-both
authorized by Section 9-504(3). On the other hand, commercial
paper, accounts and chattel paper will normally be collected by the
secured party rather than sold, since a sale would probably realize
substantially less than collection. Some general intangibles-such
as good will, literary rights, copyrights and the like-will probably
be sold; others-for example, rights to payment which are excluded
from the definition of "accounts" in Section 9-106-would normally
be collected
Some limitations on this generally flexible approach must,
however, be mentioned. Sections 1-102(3), 1-203 and 1-208 of the
Code impose basic-and undisclaimable-obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care upon both secured parties and
debtors. In addition, Section 1-103 provides that general legal and
equitable principles apply under the Code, unless expressly displaced by a particular Code provision. 10 And Section 9-501(3), modi9. It is not intended to suggest that the methods noted are the only "commercially
reasonable" ways of realizing on given types of collateral. The whole thrust of Part 5 of Article
9, after all, is that "circumstances alter cases."
10. For an example of such a supplementing of the Code by non-Code principles, see
notes 17 and 18 and accompanying text, infra.
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fled by the 1972 Official Text to reflect changes in Sections 9-504(3)
and 9-505(2), contains specific restrictions on the parties' right to
vary the Code default provisions by agreement. The parties may
not, in the security agreement, waive or vary the following to the
extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the
secured party: (a) the provisions of Sections 9-502(2) and 9-504(2),
insofar as they require accounting for surplus proceeds of collateral;
(b) Sections 9-504(3) and 9-505(1), which deal with disposition of
collateral; (c) Section 9-505(2), concerning a proposal by a secured
party to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation; (d)
Section 9-506, which deals with redemption of collateral; and (e)
Section 9-507(1), which prescribes the secured party's liability for
failure to comply with Part 5. The parties may nevertheless
determine in the security agreement the standards by which the
fulfillment of the rights and duties under the cited sections is to be
measured, if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable."
However, some of the rights granted debtors in the cited sections may be modified or renounced by an agreement in writing
signed by the debtor-but only after default. Under both former and
Revised Article 9, the debtor's right to compel a disposition of consumer goods collateral, where he has paid 60 percent of the cash
price or 60 percent of the loan (9-505(1)), and his right of redemption
under Section 9-506 may be so modified or renounced. Revised Article 9 additionally permits the debtor, in a statement signed by him
after default, to modify or renounce his right to notification of a sale
under Section 9-504(3) and his rights under Section 9-505(2). The
premise of these provisions is, of course, that the ability of a secured
party to overreach a debtor in the areas in question is substantially
lessened after default.
Thus the deliberate flexibility of Part 5 of Article 9-subject,
however, to the general standard of "commercial reasonableness"
and to the other limitations discussed above, designed to prevent
overreaching on the part of secured parties-reflects the expansive
definition of "security interest" in Section 1-201(37) and accommodates the ever-increasing variety of secured transactions in the
modern market place. The purpose of this article is to examine how
11. 9-501(3). In Borochoff Properties, Inc. v. Howard Lumber Co., 115 Ga. App. 691,
155 S.E.2d 651 (1967), the court noted that default was one of the standards determined
contractually by the parties under this subsection.
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Part 5 of Article 9 works in practice, and the potential impact of
recent judicial developments upon its provisions.
Since it is the act of default which triggers Part 5 of Article 9,
let us begin by asking:
II.

"DEFAULT": WHAT

Is IT?

As one might expect, the answer is: Almost anything the parties
say it is. The Code does not define "default," and the general
freedom-of-contract rule of Section 1-102(3) gives the parties great
leeway to provide their own definition, subject to the overriding
standards of good faith and reasonableness set forth in that section
and in Sections 1-203 and 1-208.
In the absence of agreement as to what constitutes default, a
court may well hold that the term is restricted to its customary
meaning of a failure to pay or perform. '- Accordingly, most security
agreements include a paragraph captioned "Events of Default."
Common boilerplate lists among such events: (1) failure to pay the
secured obligation (or any installment) when due, or to perform any
promise made in the security agreement; (2) breach of any warranty
made in the security agreement or any concurrently executed document (such as a loan agreement); (3) any misrepresentation in either the security agreement or any other document delivered by or
on behalf of the debtor to the secured party in the course of financing; (4) any event accelerating the maturity of other indebtedness
of the debtor under another undertaking; (5) creation of any encumbrance upon the collateral;" (6) any levy, judicial seizure or
attachment of the collateral; (7) any uninsured loss or theft of or
damage to the collateral; (8) death or dissolution of the debtor; and
(9) insolvency of the debtor, or his or its subjection to a receivership,
an assignment for the benefit of creditors or a bankruptcy proceeding.
The parties may, of course, add other events to this list. Some
draftsmen, who may prefer brevity, simply use an "insecurity
11.1 See, e.g., Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co., 119 Ga. App. 813, 168 S.E.2d 827 (1969).
12. The creation of an encumbrance on the collateral includes, of course, the granting
of a junior security interest in the collateral to another party. Section 9-311, unchanged by
the 1972 amendments, permits the debtor to do this, notwithstanding any contrary agreement. The secured party, when he learns that a debtor has done so, may or may not waive
the default. If his intention is not to do so, he would be wise to act promptly upon learning
that the debtor has created a junior security interest. Many secured creditors are, however,
not at all concerned about other creditors, secured or not, standing behind them.
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clause" of the type referred to in Section 1-208 of the Code 3 as a
shorthand means of covering all the events of default mentioned-and more. The "more," however, can cause problems. The
better reasoned cases, as well as the good-faith requirement of Section 1-208, suggest that invocation of an insecurity clause requires
somewhat more of a feeling of insecurity on the creditor's part than
might warrant his seeing a psychiatrist. 4 The creditor should be
able to point to some event, or some information received by him,
that constitutes a good reason to feel insecure. 5 A sudden premonition, without more, is not a sound basis on which to act.
Some limitations, however, should be noted. To begin with, it
can be expensive to proceed under Part 5 of Article 9 without first
insuring that an actual default has occurred. In Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corp.,'5 the Tenth Circuit affirmed an award of punitive damages, in an amount almost twice the value of the collateral,
against a secured party which had seized collateral four days before
13. Section 1-208 provides:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate payment
or performance or require collateral or additional collateral "at will" or "when he
deems himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be construed to mean that
he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of
payment or performance is impaired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith
is on the party against whom the power has been exercised.
14. See, e.g., Parks v. Phillips, 71 Nev. 313, 289 P.2d 1053 (1955) (upholding verdict
for buyer under a conditional sales contract where he claimed damages arising out of repossession of his vehicle by the seller 30 days before any default in payments); compare Roy v.
Goings, 96 Ill. 361 (1880) (holding that the foreclosure of a mortgage on crops by a mortgagee
under an insecurity clause was not in good faith where the mortgagee claimed insecurity
because the mortgage was defective and inoperative), and Furlong v. Cox, 77 Ill. 293 (1875)
(holding that the mortgagor and mortgagee could not have intended to give the latter an
uncontrolled option to repossess collateral under a mortgage with an insecurity clause where
the collateral was property indispensable to the carrying on of a business), with Hogan v.
Akin, 181 Ill. 448, 55 N.E. 137 (1899) (finding error in the exclusion of testimony tending to
show that at the time of repossession the mortgagee had probable cause for feeling insecure).
15. In Van Horn v. Van De Wol, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 959, 497 P.2d 252 (1972), an
unsecured creditor holding a note of the defendant corporation, who accelerated payment
under an insecurity clause because of a belief that the defendant had been denied a bank
loan, was held to have acted in good faith even though the belief was erroneous. The court
found that the plaintiff knew that the defendant, which operated a golf course, had lost
money during the prior business year, was faced with increasing competition from a newly
established public golf course, and had refused to refrain from mortgaging the corporate realty
until after plaintiff had been paid. The court concluded that the overall view of defendant's
financial stability known to plaintiff justified his action, even if part of his information was
erroneous. (The Washington enactment of 1-208 did not include the second sentence thereof;
the omission appears without effect upon the decision.)
16. 439 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1971). The opinion, extremely well written, is worth reading
for enjoyment alone.
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the debtor's first monthly payment was due and at a time when the
debtor was not in default. Also, even though an event of default (as
defined in the security agreement) has occurred, that fact is not
always sufficient to trigger the default provisions of Article 9.
Margolin v. Franklin7 is a recent case in point. A secured party
under an automobile security agreement had, over a seven-month
period, regularly accepted payments which were eight to 12 days
late. Suddenly, and without notice to the debtor, he repossessed the
automobile 12 days after a contract payment date. Even though the
debtor was technically in default, the court held that the secured
party was required to give the debtor reasonable and specific notice
of his sudden decision to hold the debtor to the strict terms of the
security agreement."
Let us assume, however, that an event of default sufficient to
invoke the default provisions of Article 9 has occurred. What may
the secured party do?
I.

THE RIGHT TO SELF-HELP

Because of a desire to minimize realization expenses, the secured party frequently first considers the avenue of self-help repossession and sale. At this writing, however, the continued availability
of traditional self-help repossessions is in some doubt. The self-help
provision, insofar as tangible collateral (or "goods") is concerned,"
is found in Section 9-503. It provides in part:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default
the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action.
This portion of Section 9-503 is currently the focus of constitutional
attacks based upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sniadach
2
v. Family Finance Corp.20 and Fuentes v. Shevin. 1
17. 132 Ill. App. 2d 527, 270 N.E. 2d 140 (1st Dist. 1971). A more recent like holding is
Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Waters, 273 So.2d 96 (Fla. App. 1973).
18. In this case, the common law of waiver and estoppel supplemented the Code provisions, as contemplated by 1-103.
19. Insofar as intangible collateral is concerned, 9-502 is a self-help provision. See
discussion following note 54 infra.
20. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
21. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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Self-help repossession finds roots in the common law. 22 Under
the Code it is invoked as to all classes of "goods" collateral (described in Section 9-109): consumer goods, equipment, farm products and inventory. 3 Reported litigation over self-help repossession,
however, has so far centered upon what may be the most frequent
use of that remedy: the seizure of consumer automobile collateral. 21
Under Section 9-503 repossession may be effected without judicial process if it does not involve a "breach of the peace." A potential breach of the peace situation is presented, for example, where
the debtor has made known his objection to repossession of the
collateral by the creditor.2 5 In such cases, the secured party must
proceed by judicial "action."" Conversely, cases where the secured
party repossesses by stealth, not involving a threat of violence and
not disturbing the peace and quiet of the community, have been
held not to constitute a breach of the peace."
22.

2 F. POLLOCK & F.

MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

574 (2d ed. 1968); 2

856-58 (T. Cooley, 4th Ed. 1899).
23. While self-help may in theory also be invoked as to instruments, chattel paper and
documents, a security interest in these classes of collateral is normally a possessory one from
the outset. Accordingly, the self-help concept is primarily associated with goods.
24. As the amicus curiae brief of the Permanent Editorial Board in Adams v. Egley,
discussed infra note 44, points out at page 21 there are several reasons for the popularity of
automobile repossessions. While other consumer goods are often taken as collateral primarily
for psychological reasons, automobiles are treated as genuine collateral by all secured parties,
since there is a second-hand car market in which substantial value may be realized. Also,
automobiles are most likely to be available for peaceful repossession, since they appear on
the streets, and at the same time are the most likely to suffer removal from the places of their
usual keeping by a debtor who believes or suspects that repossession is imminent.
25. Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 N.E.2d 683 (1970)
(removal of lawn mower from debtor's premises over debtor's objection by coercion constituted breach of peace and subjected secured party to action for trespass and conversion);
Stone Mach. Co. v. Kessler, 1 Wash. App. 750, 463 P. 2d 651 (1970).
26. The term "action" is defined in 1-201(1) to include "recoupment, counterclaim, setoff, suit in equity and any other proceedings in which rights are determined." The term means
a summons and complaint under New York practice; a motion for repossession is insufficient.
Dolbeck Sanitation, Inc. v. A. & M. Carting Enterprises, Inc., 11 U.C.C. Rep. 628 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. 1972). In In re Yale Express System Inc., 250 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. N.Y. 1966), rev'd on
other grounds 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir.1966), the court observed that this included an action for
replevin. Currently replevin is available only in states whose procedure has conformed to, or
has been altered to conform to, the requirements outlined in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972), discussed in ensuing text.
27. Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277,282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd.
mrnem., 288 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1968), (entry into premises leased by the debtor and then in the
possession of an assignee for the benefit of his creditors by use of a key obtained without
authorization and the removal therefrom by employees of a bank of collateral covered by a
security agreement, even if a trespass, did not constitute a breach of the peace, since "there
was nothing in what they did that disturbed public order by any act of violence, caused
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 [1973], Art. 1

274

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

The constitutional battle presently under way, however, may
render the distinction between judicial and "self-help" remedies
academic. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.8 was the opening gun
in that battle. Sniadach involved a Wisconsin pre-judgment wage
garnishment procedure, under which wages were frozen on the service of a garnishment writ pending the outcome of the underlying
action. The Supreme Court held that the procedure constituted a
taking of property without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing, thereby violating the procedural due process guarantee of the
fourteenth amendment. The property of which the wage-earner was
deprived was the use of the garnished portion of her wages during
the interim period between the service of the garnishment and the
determination of the main suit. Significantly, the Court stressed the
nature of the property right in issue, calling it "a specialized type
of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system"29
and commenting that garnishments of the Wisconsin type "may as
a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall." 3
Sniadach spawned two lines of decisions in response to constitutional attacks upon statutory replevin and similar procedures.
One line, represented by Blair v. Pitchess3" and LaPrease v. Raymours FurnitureCo.,32 held statutory replevin procedures unconstitutional on the Sniadach rationale. The other line, represented by
Fuentes v. Faircloth3 and Brunswick Corp. v. J & P. Inc., 34 held
such procedures constitutional, often-as in both of the cited
cases3-on the theory that Sniadach was limited to the "specialized
property" situation the Court there stressed.
consternation or alarm, or disturbed the peace and quiet of the community"); Thompson v.
Ford Motor Credit Co. 324 F. Supp. 108 (D.S.C. 1971); Harris Truck & Trailer Sales v. Foote,
58 Tenn. App. 710, 436 S.W.2d 460 (1968) (question of breach of peace erroneously submitted
to jury).
28. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
29. Id. at 340.
30. Id. at 341-42.
31. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
32. 315 F.Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
33. 317 F.Supp. 954 (S.D.Fla. 1970), rev'd sub. nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972), discussed in following text.
34. 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970). This replevin action involved bowling equipment, a
fact used in later cases as a basis for a distinction between commercial and consumer situations. In Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), the lower court held this "a
distinction without a difference as far as Due Process is concerned." Id. at 957.
35. See Brunswick Corp. v. J. & P., Inc., 424 F.2d at 105, quoted and followed in
Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. at 957.
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In general, the replevin procedures attacked permitted a private party, without notice to the other party, to obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin through a summary process of ex parte
application to a court clerk, upon the posting of a bond for double
the value of the property to be seized. The sheriff was then required
to execute the writ by seizing the property and holding it for three
days or so, during which the defendant might reclaim possession by
posting his own security bond in like amount. In default of a
counter-replevin bond the sheriff delivered the property to the
plaintiff pending a final judgment in the underlying action.
In Fuentes v. Shevin,36 however, the Supreme Court, in a fourto-three decision, held such Florida and Pennsylvania statutory replevin procedures invalid under the fourteenth amendment-in the
process casting considerable doubt on the apparent "specialized
property" limitation of Sniadach3 -on the ground that they deprived persons of property without due process by failing to provide
notice and an opportunity to be heard before seizure of the property.
Mr. Justice White, for the dissenters, quoted the portion of Section
9-503 set forth above, and observed:
Recent studies have suggested no changes in Art. 9 in
this respect. See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Review Committee for Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, Final Report, § 9-503
(April 25, 1971). I am content to rest on the judgment of
those who have wrestled with these problems so long and
often and upon the judgment of the legislatures that have
considered and so recently adopted provisions that contemplate precisely what has happened in these cases.38
In February 1972-four months before the Supreme Court's
decision in Fuentes, and amid a growing divergence of views concerning the scope of Sniadach-the first decision sustaining a constititutional attack on Section 9-503 was rendered in Adams v.
Egley.3 1 A similarly grounded attack had failed a year earlier. ° How36. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
37. See 407 U.S. at 88-90; but see id. at 90 n.21, pointing out that "the relative weight
of . . . property interests" is not without bearing upon "the form of notice and hearing
required by due process."
38. Id. at 103. Justice White was the author of the dissenting opinion, concurred in by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Justice Stewart wrote for the majority (Justices
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall concurring). Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in the decision.
39. 338 F.Supp. 614 (S.D.Cal. 1972), appeal pending sub. nom. Adams v. Southern
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ever, this earlier decision was only a trickle of the flood to come. The
constitutionality of Section 9-503 as applied to automobile repossessions is now under challenge in litigation pending in all parts of the
nation. As of this writing a substantial majority of the reported
decisions have upheld its constitutionality, 4' almost entirely on the
basis of absence of state action. Ultimate decision of the issue by
the Supreme Court seems assured.
Since Adams v. Egley has progressed the farthest of the reported decisions, it is appropriate to discuss it briefly. Adams v.
Egley was an action for a declaratory judgment and damages, involving self-help repossessions of motor vehicles by secured parties
after default. In one instance, the secured party had sold the repossessed vehicle. In both of the situations before the court, the debtors
had been in default for several months and constant requests for
payment had been made. Represented by the Legal Aid Society of
San Diego, the debtors challenged the validity of the repossessions
on constitutional grounds derived from Sniadach. The important
threshold question before the court was whether the repossessions
constituted "state action" for fourteenth amendment purposes.4,
The court rejected defendants' contention that no state action could
be found, since the repossessions were undertaken by private parties
in accordance with the provisions of a security agreement; it held
that the mere presence of Section 9-503 in the statute books satisfied
43
the state action requirement.
California First Nat'l Bank, No. 72-1484, Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. See note 44 infra.
40. McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 332 F.Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
41. Decisions holding 9-503 constitutional, in addition to that cited in the preced52,046 (D.
ing footnote, are Colvin v. Avco Fin. Services, Inc., 4 C.C.H. SEc. TM. Guide
Utah 1973); Kirksey v. Thelig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l
Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672
(W.D. Va. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Kipp v. Cozens,
11 U.C.C. Rep. 1067 (Super. Ct. Calif. 1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J.
Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972), and numerous unreported decisions in power courts, mostly in
California. Decisions holding that section unconstitutional, in addition to Adams v. Egley,
are Gibbs v. Titelman, - F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1972), and Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Dinitz, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 627 (N.Y. Civ. 1972).
42. An alternative ground of attack made on 9-503 in this case was that the repossessions were "under color of state law" and violated the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1968).
43. The court rested this holding on Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In that
case the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Supreme Court of California voiding under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment a provision of the California Constitution which prohibited restrictions on an individual's right to sell or lease real estate to
whomever he chose. The California court had found that the constitutional provision, adopted
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The ultimate question thus became which line of authorities on
pre-judgment replevin to follow. The court chose the first line, and
held Sections 9-503 and 9-504 unconstitutional, at least as applied
to the facts before the court, under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In the course of its opinion the court noted
the following: (1) Sniadach meant a return of the entire domain of
pre-judgment remedies to the long-standing procedural due process
principle that, except in extraordinary circumstances, an individual
may not be deprived of his property without notice and hearing; (2)
the waiver of a constitutional right is not to be found in a situation
where the contracting parties are not of equal bargaining power and
standard form contracts are involved; (3) repossession without judicial process often results in the taking of property not included as
collateral in the security agreement, particularly where the subjects
of seizures are vehicles, which may contain other property stored
inside; and (4) the subjects of consumer secured transactions are
commonly household appliances, furniture and automobiles-all of
which may be considered necessary for ordinary day-to-day living
and hence within the rationale of Sniadach. An appeal from this
decision is currently pending before the Court of Appeals for the
44
Ninth Circuit.
Unless and until the Supreme Court rules adversely to the conin 1964 pursuant to an initiative and referendum, overturned state laws enacted from 1959
to 1963 bearing on the right of private persons to discriminate, that it invalidly involved the
state in racial discrimination in the housing market and that it changed the situation from
one in which discriminatory practices were restricted to one in which they were encouraged.
44. The appeal, under the name Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, No.
72-1484, was argued orally before the Ninth Circuit on January 12, 1973. Among the briefs
submitted on appeal was an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Permanent Editorial Board.
In outline, the Board's brief, prepared by Professor Soia Mentschikoff of the University of
Chicago Law School, argues the following: (1) the Code fairly allocates rights and duties in
the event of default on secured transactions; (2) the nature of automobile sales and financing
is such as to leave only a minute number of debtors with defenses which would entitle them
to continued use of the automobile serving as collateral; (3) prior judicial review, with its
consequent delays, would enhance the evils involved in the cases of bad faith or dishonest
debtors, while leaving untouched the evils involved in cases of bad faith or dishonest secured
creditors; and (4) prior judicial notice and hearing is not constitutionally required for the
taking of possession of property after a debtor's default under a statutory scheme which also
provides for immediate injunctive relief ordering return in the rare cases of improper taking,
when the economic and other consequences of such requirements would be materially burdensome to all debtors and to the public at large. An unpublished article by Dr. Robert W.
Johnson, Purdue University, entitled Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analysis, is an appendix to the brief. Dr. Johnson was Reporter-Economist on the drafting of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code and is currently a Presidential appointee to the National
Commission on Consumer Finance as a public member.
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stitutionality of Section 9-503, it may be anticipated that creditors
not directly bound by Adams v. Egley will continue to effect selfhelp repossessions under Section 9-503.
At this point, it should be noted that-although, as the court
indicated in Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc.," most repossession
cases involve creditors who have been patient with debtors in an
effort to obtain payment and avoid repossession-there are cases of
creditor overeagerness or abuse. A creditor may accelerate payment
in bad faith or may otherwise repossess before default. The debtor
has two remedies in this situation. He may seek return of the automobile and damages for the wrongful repossession, or he may seek
damages in conversion. Decisions under the Code, as well as under
pre-Code law, make it clear that a secured party, quite apart from
constitutional considerations, must be reasonably sure of his ground
before he repossesses.47
Rights, Remedies and Duties of Secured Party in Possession
A secured party who takes possession after default, whether through
self-help or with the aid of a court, must be mindful of his duties
and aware of his-rirghts and remedies. These are catalogued in Section 9-207, which was not changed by the 1972 amendments and
which (as Official Comment 2 points out) essentially restates the
common law of pledge.
The primary duty of a secured party in possession is to use
reasonable care in the custody and preservation of the collateral, an
obligation which may not be disclaimed but one as to which stan45. 121 N.J. Super. 1, -, 295 A.2d 402, 406-08 (1972).
46. The amicus curiae brief filed by the Permanent Editorial Bord in Adams v. Southern CaliforniaFirstNat'l Bank (see notes 39 and 44 supra) argues that "if self-help does result
in repossession, a debtor with a right to continued use may immediately request a mandatory
injunction restoring possession to him on such terms as a court of equity may decree." Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code at 26.
It seems clear that disposition of a chattel wrongfully repossessed could be restrained
under 9-507(1), and the additional step of directing its return can be characterized as ancillary relief. Section 9-507(1) authorizes recovery of damages for the wrongful repossession.
Recovery in conversion is authorized by the common law supplementing the Code, as contemplated by 1-103.
47. See, e.g., Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d 339, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1970)
(creditors assessed with general damages of $2,812 and punitive damages of $33,000 for
wrongful repossession), and Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corp., 439 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir.
1971) (creditor assessed with general damages of $770 and punitive damages of $7,500 for
wrongful repossession). Pre-Code case illustrations may be found in Hogan, supra note 7, at
212, n.30.
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dards that are not "manifestly unreasonable" may be set by the
security agreement." Violation of this duty can be expensive to a
secured party, as illustrated by a recent Maryland case, Harris v.
Bower.4" A secured party who had repossessed a boat appraised at
$13,900 failed to maintain it and permitted it to depreciate "at a
ruinously progressive rate" for a period covering two boating seasons, in a manner the court found "not only not commercially reasonable but . . also utterly lacking in common sense." While the
court rejected the debtor's argument that the secured party had in
effect accepted the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation, it
observed that he had "come perilously close to painting himself into a corner in this regard" and held that the lower court could, on
remand, credit the debtor with $13,900, the uncontroverted market
value of the boat at the time of repossession. The court concluded
that, after allowance of a proper credit, the secured party, who had
become the record owner of the boat, "may make whatever disposition of it suits his fancy." Normally, of course, the secured party
performs the duty of care of the collateral without having to be told
to do so, since it is in his self-interest to act with reasonable promptness and thereby realize the maximum value from the collateral.
An important right of the secured party in possession, particularly with respect to equipment collateral, is that he may use or
operate the collateral (1) for the purpose of preserving the collateral
or its value, (2) pursuant to the order of a court of appropriate
jurisdiction or (3) except as to consumer goods (concerning which
the Code imposes restrictions on the rights of the secured party), in
the manner and to the extent provided in the security agreement.'
But this right must, of course, be exercised in a manner consistent
with the duties imposed by Section 9-207 and by Part 5 of Article
9. Although those duties are typically of greater concern to the se48. See 1-102(3).
49. 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972).
50. Since the secured party had failed not only to preserve the collateral but also to
dispose of it with reasonable promptness, the court could have reached this conclusion via
either 9-207(3) and (4) itself, or 9-507(1), which renders a secured party liable to the debtor
for failure to comply with the requirements of Part 5 of Article 9. Although 9-207 does not
itself appear in Part 5, it is incorporated therein by 9-501(1) and (2). It may be noted that
consumer legislation in some states-see, for example, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§ 526, 580
(1971) -may well convert unreasonable delay in disposition on the part of a secured party
in possession into a forced election to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt. The
Code, however, takes a different approach. See 9-505(1).
51. See 9-207(4).
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cured party who has a possessory security interest ab initio than to
a secured party with a filed security interest who has merely taken
possession after default, 52 the latter kind of secured party
should-as Harrisv. Bower shows-keep those duties well in mind. 3
IV.

REALIZATION ON COLLATERAL

We now arrive at the stage in default procedure which is of
greatest concern to secured parties, and to which all of the preceding
steps-determination of default, repossession of the collateral and
its preservation while in the secured party's custody-are ultimately
directed: disposition of the collateral by the secured party in a manner which realizes its maximum value.
Part 5 of Article 9 provides three broad methods (within each
of which a mnultitude of minor variations can be found) for realizing
on collateral: (1) collection, (2) sale, lease, or "other disposition" to
third parties and (3) retention of the collateral by the secured party
52. Much of the decisional law under 9-207 has involved the care of instrument collateral which was the subject of possessory security interests. See, e.g., Reed v. Central Nat'l
Bank, 421 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1970); Grace v. Sterling, Grace & Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 61, 289
N.Y.S.2d 632 (1st Dep't 1968), both of which held secured parties liable for failure to exercise
conversion rights on debentures resulting in impairment of value when they were not converted into stock prior to the redemption call date. Section 9-207(3) provides that a secured
party is liable for any loss caused by his failure to meet any obligation imposed by subsections
(1) and (2) thereof but that he does not thereby lose his security interest. It is common
practice in drafting security agreements covering possessory security interests-especially
where the collateral is securities-to include a paragraph which imposes upon the debtor the
duty of exercising conversion rights and the like. Such a clause, if carelessly drafted, may go
beyond the "determin[ation] of standards by which [reasonableness and care] is to be
measured" permitted by 1-102(3), and resemble more closely an outright-and forbidden-disclaimer of those obligations by the secured party. However, it is believed that the
act of pledging securities (for example) ought not by itself to impose upon the secured party
the full range of duties, often subject to the second-guessing provided by hindsight, which
would be expected of a trustee.
53. In passing, it should be noted that the status of a possessory security interest (as
opposed to one under which the secured party takes possession only after default) in light of
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972),
is somewhat unclear. It can be argued that a disposition after default of collateral continually
in the possession of the secured party, since it serves to deprive the debtor of his ultimate
ownership of the collateral, should be treated in the same manner for due process purposes
as a repossession of collateral by the secured party. On the other hand, the decided cases have
focused less upon the question of ultimate ownership than upon deprivation of possession an emphasis which would suggest that sale of collateral subject to a possessory security
interest should be constitutionally permissible even without notice and hearing, irrespective
of asserted constitutional deficiencies in self-help repossessions. See, e.g., Magro v. Lentini
Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd on opinion below, 460
F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972), upholding the warehouseman's lien
foreclosure provisions of 7-210 against due process objections.
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in discharge of the debtor's obligation. As indicated above, which
method a secured party will prefer normally depends principally on
the type of collateral in question. At the outset, it may be noted that
the Code provision dealing with the first method of realization-collection from third parties (Section 9-502)-has produced
the least reported litigation among the Article 9 default sections. On
the other hand, the provisions for disposition to third parties (Section 9-504) has produced the most reported litigation among these
sections. Apparently no reported case to date has involved a proposal to accept the collateral in discharge of the obligation under
Section 9-505-at least not a proposal the secured party knew he
was making. As we will see, some cases have denied a deficiency
judgment to a secured party after a disposition ruled defective
under Section 9-504 by equating, in substance, the disposition with
a proposal under Section 9-505.
A.

Collection

Collection is the normal method of realization on most intangible and paper collateral.5 4
The most liquid assets of a business debtor are the obligations
owing to him by his customers. These obligations-or rights to payment-are classified, now that the class of contract rights has been
eliminated from Article 9,55 as accounts, general intangibles, chattel
paper or instruments, depending on how they are evidenced. An
open account arising from a sale on unsecured credit is probably the
simplest form of such an obligation. A motor vehicle retail instalment contract evidencing a purchase money security interest in an
automobile sold by a dealer is a more complex illustration; such a
contract becomes chattel paper when used by the seller to finance
his inventory.
Sometimes the businessman merely grants his lender a security
interest in such obligations. The businessman collects the accounts
54. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. In some cases, intangible and paper
collateral will be divided into categories on the basis of "collectibility." The secured party
will then himself collect the "good" accounts under 9-502, selling the remainder pursuant to
9-504 (often at a discount and to a firm which specializes in difficult collections). Both the
collection and the sale must be "commercially reasonable," of course. The secured party
confronting a bundle of doubtful accounts may also hire a collection firm-again, subject to
the requirement of commercial reasonableness-and "deduct his reasonable expenses of realization from the collections," holding his debtor liable for any resulting deficiency. See 9502(2). The choice of method depends, here as elsewhere, on practicalities.
55. See 9-106. A conforming change was made in 9-502(2) and 9-504(2).
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in regular course, as permitted by Section 9-205, and the lender does
not normally notify the businessman's customers to make payment
directly to the lender unless the businessman defaults. This type of
financing is sometimes known as non-notification financing."
Sometimes, in arrangements which are called "factoring," the businessman sells his accounts or chattel paper outright to his financier;
such a sale may be either with or without recourse." Because of the
complex provisions of many arrangements involving a transfer of
accounts or chattel paper, and the resulting difficulty of deciding
8
whether the transfer is for security purposes or is a genuine sale
Article 9 has always covered both forms of transaction."
The collection rights of a secured party, which should be considered in light of this background, are set forth in Section 9-502.
Whenever it is so agreed, and in any event on default, the secured
party may notify an account debtor (i.e., the person obligated to his
debtor on an account which is collateral)" or the obligor on an
instrument to make payment to him directly, whether or not his
own debtor had previously been making collections on the collateral; the secured party may also take control of any proceeds to
which he is entitled under Section 9-306. A secured party who is
entitled to recourse against the debtor (or who expects to seek a
deficiency judgment against him) and who undertakes collection
from account debtors or obligors must proceed in a commercially
reasonable manner and may, if he does so, deduct from collections
his reasonable expenses of realization.
If the security agreement secures an indebtedness, the secured
party must account to the debtor for any surplus and, unless agreed
otherwise, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. If, however, the
underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the
debtor is entitled to any surplus or liable for any deficiency only if
the security agreement so provides.
The secured party frequently encounters no trouble in collecting-or no more trouble than the debtor would have if the debtor
56. Greenberg, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 601,
617-18.
57. Id. at 616-17.
58. The difference was litigated under pre-Code law. See Blackford v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 263 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 825 (1959).
59. See 9-102(1)(a) and Official Comment thereto.
60. An "account debtor" is defined under 9-105(1) (a) as "the person who is obligated
on an account, chattel paper or general intangible." The words "contract right" were deleted
by the 1972 amendments to conform to the change in 9-106. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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were doing the collecting. As the paucity of reported cases under
Section 9-502 suggests, paper and intangible collateral do not often
present the difficult realization problems that are frequently encountered in disposing of other types of collateral.
B.

Disposition by Sale, Lease, "or Otherwise"

Sale is the normal method of realization in the case of tangible
collateral-i.e., "goods." Lease as a method of realization was an
innovation of original Article 9; if reported decisions are any indication of its utilization, it has not been frequently used. Similarly,
although Section 9-504(1) provides that a secured party may, after
default, "sell, lease or otherwise dispose of' collateral, apparently
no one has yet proposed an "or otherwise" disposition that would
meet the "commercially reasonable" requirement of Section 9504(3).
In general, a Section 9-504 disposition may be of all, or any
part, of the collateral, in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing, and may be "at any
time and place and on any terms" so long as "every aspect" of the
disposition is "commercially reasonable." Any sale, of course, is
subject to the Article on Sales-Article 2.
1.

The Requirement of Commercial Reasonableness

The first two sentences of Section 9-504(3) impose the requirement of commercial reasonableness for any disposition thereunder.
They state:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made by way of one or more
contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or
in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms
but every aspect of the disposition including the method,
manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable.
This criterion was intended to substitute a measure of flexibility for
the sometimes straight-jacketing requirements of pre-Code law. The
overriding mandate is "commercial reasonableness"; the particulars to be observed are "method, manner, time, place and terms."
How can a secured party flesh out this rather loose, but pervasive,
criterion?
As the Comment to Section 9-507(2) notes, in view of the sancProduced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
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tions provided by subsection (1) of that section against a secured
party who does not dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, "it is of great importance to make clear what types of
disposition are to be considered commercially reasonable." Section
9-507(2) accordingly enables a secured party who has doubts to
obtain a binding opinion in advance of a disposition. It provides that
a disposition which has been approved in any judicial proceeding or
by any bona fide creditors' committee or representative of creditors
is conclusively deemed commercially reasonable." A declaratory
judgment proceeding, for example, was used in Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Penrose Industries Corp.12 to obtain a ruling that a proposed
private disposition of the stock of a radio station was commercially
reasonable.
Section 9-507(2) also provides some specific criteria of what is
commercially reasonable: (1) a sale in the usual manner in a recognized market; (2) a sale at the price current in a recognized market
at the time of sale; and (3) a sale in conformity with reasonable
commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold.
However, these criteria in turn generate questions. What, for example, is a "recognized market"? As to investment securities collateral, probably no one would question that the New York Stock
Exchange is a recognized market. Beyond that, however, there
seems little certainty except in a negative way. Several decisions
have held that there is not a recognized market for used automobiles. 3 It follows, of course, that a price listed in a dealer's redbook
or bluebook is not a price current in such a market.
Finally, the first sentence of Section 9-507(2) provides some aid
to the secured party against his debtor, or other creditors, who may
try to second-guess him on price alone: "The fact that a better price
could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself
sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially
reasonable manner." This provision applies to Code sales a rule
61. The sentence goes on to say that this does not indicate that any such approval must
be obtained in any case nor does it indicate that any disposition not so approved is not
commercially reasonable.
62. 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968), af'g 280 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Pa.). The case is noted
subsequently at notes 65 and 111 infra.
63. Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 131, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966); Community Management Ass'n v. Tousely, Colo. App. -,
505 P.2d 1314 (1973); Nelson
v. Monarch Inv. Plan, Inc. 452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 1970); Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195
Pa. Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548 (1961).
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followed in bankruptcy sales.64 While it may be helpful to a secured
party on occasion, it does not (as the words "of itself' show) insulate
him from the consequences of a disposition which, on all the evidence, was not commercially reasonable.
2. More on Commercial Reasonableness: "Method, Manner,
Time, Place and Terms"
The fundamental question in determining the reasonableness of
a disposition is usually its form: should it be by way of public sale,
private sale, lease or "otherwise"? While no flat rules can be stated,
there are some guidelines which follow from the specific rules of
Section 9-504(3) and from the case law. In situations where it is
customary to sell goods (such as livestock) by auction, for example,
it may be that a public sale is the only "commercially reasonable"
method of disposition; at least it would seem difficult to fault the
secured party for so proceeding. In cases where there is no ready
public market for the collateral and the secured party knows of a
particular buyer with a need for such goods, a private sale would
seem commercially reasonable, and an attempt at public auction
might well not be. 5 No doubt there are other situations in which a
private sale would result in a greater realization than a public auction, or, for that matter, in which (as the Official Comment to
Section 9-505 tells us) "the parties [would be] better off without a
resale of the collateral" at all.
It seems likely, however, that the preferred method of disposition will be the public sale. But here we run into difficulty. Notwithstanding the mass of reported decisions under the default provisions
of Article 9, a clear answer to the question of what constitutes a
"public sale" under Section 9-504 has still not crystallized. The
question apparently has not been considered by courts of last resort,
and is not extensively dealt with even in reported lower court decisions.66 Some reliable guidelines for a secured party contemplating
a public sale can, however, be culled from pre-Code law.
64. See, e.g., In re Stanley Eng'r Corp., 164 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied sub
nom. Root v. Galman, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
65. In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Industries, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 698, 713 (E.D.
Pa.), af'd, 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968), the secured parties relied upon thoroughly experienced
advice from a large media broker that "a private or 'negotiated' sale would produce the
highest price" for the stock of a radio station. A public or "semi private" sale of limited
bidding was rejected because of S.E.C. problems.
66. In American Plan Corp. v. Eiseman, 4 Ohio App. 2d 385, 212 N.E.2d 824 (1965),
the court assumed without discussion that a public sale had been made. In Massey-Ferguson
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There is evidence that the draftsmen of the Code considered
"public sale" to mean a sale by auction. 7 That implies a sale at
which the public is invited, by prior advertisement, to appear and
bid for the goods to be sold.1 The goods should, of course, be available for inspection by prospective bidders before the sale; the advertisement should appear in at least one newspaper of general circulation, reasonably in advance of the time of sale, and should provide
reasonable information concerning the time and place of sale69 and
what is to be sold.70 The goods must be offered and sold for cash to
the highest responsible bidder;" and bidders must, of course, know
of other bids and be permitted to raise their bids.72 The place of sale,
moreover, must be accessible to the general public," and the sale
itself, if not conducted by one of the parties, must generally be
under the direction of a licensed auctioneer.7 4
A sale in which these incidents are observed should be held a
"public sale" under Section 9-504. Since a secured party may buy
at a public sale, but not at a private sale, it is important that he
not be under an erroneous impression as to the nature of the
sale-especially in view of the sanctions for non-compliance with
Section 9-504 provided by Section 9-507(1).
Insofar as the timing of a disposition under Section 9-504 is
concerned, there are limitations which a secured party must observe
Fin. Corp. v. Hamlin, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 142 (Tenn. App. 1971), the court held that a notice of a
public sale was not a reasonable one and defeated the purpose of a public sale; see note 69
infra. In In re Bishop, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1071 (Ref., W.D. Va. 1972), the court reviewed several
of the criteria mentioned in ensuing text and concluded that the sale was not a public one
because it was not advertised in any newspaper or even by signs.
67. Comment 1 to 9-504 states that in respect to the requirement of a commercially
reasonable disposition, that section follows the provisions of 2-706 on resale by the seller after
a buyer's rejection. Comment 4 to 2-706 states that a public sale thereunder contemplates a
sale by auction.
68. RESTATEMENT OF SECURrrY § 48, comment c at 139 (1941).
69. Massey-Ferguson Fin. Corp. v. Hamlin, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 142 (Tenn. App. 1971), held
an advertisement of an offer to sell a repossessed tractor on a date certain "seriously defective" for failure to specify when the sale (as opposed to the offer) would take place, and, even
if the sale were to take place on a date certain, for failure to specify the hour of sale; the sale
itself was "not commercially reasonable."
70. In re Kiamie's Estate, 309 N.Y. 325, 130 N.E.2d 745 (1955). Professor Grant Gilmore
has observed that this decision is "excellent law under the Code." 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.5 at 1234 (1965).
71. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 48, comment c at 140 (1941).
72. Offredi v. Huhla, 135 Conn. 20, 60 A.2d 779 (1948) (a sale on sealed bids submitted
to the court was not a public sale).
73. Hagan v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 182 Mo. 319, 81 S.W. 171 (1904).
74. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 48, comment c at 140 (1941).
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in addition to the generally flexible standard of commercial reasonableness. First, the flexibility does not exist as to consumer goods,
where the debtor has paid 60 percent of the cash price or of the other
indebtedness secured thereby. In such cases, Section 9-505(1) requires the secured party to dispose of the goods under Section 9-504
within 90 days from the date of repossession, or risk exposure to
liability for conversion or for the 10 percent penalty provided by
Section 9-507(1).11 Secondly, a secured party who has repossessed
may not hold collateral for a long time in order to accumulate storage charges and thus increase his deficiency claim, particularly
where no reason for not making a prompt disposition exists."
There are risks to an indefinite wait in the hope of a more
favorable market. An alternative course, discussed below, is to proceed judicially, levying on the collateral under Section 9-501(5).1"'
Secured parties who have been laggard in their disposition have
been held to have accepted the collateral-however unintentionally-in satisfaction of the debt,77 or have been found liable in damages where circumstances indicated that a prompt resale would
have produced a surplus.78
Concerning the commercial reasonableness of a disposition as
a unit vis-a-vis one in parcels, the secured party must, among other
things, balance the multiple realization costs of a disposition in
parcels against a possible depression of the market by placing a
large block of the collateral thereon for sale at one time.7 9
3.

Notice of Disposition
The notice requirements with respect to a disposition, con-

75. For a case in point, see Crosby v. Basin Motor Co., 83 N.M. 77, 488 P.2d 127 (1971).
76. 9-504, Comment 6.
76.1. See notes 123-25 infra and accompanying text.
77. Bradford v. Lindsey Chevrolet Co., 117 Ga. App. 781, 161 S.E.2d 904 (1968) (retention of repossessed car for 50 days before filing suit and for 12 months after filing without
demand for payment); Brownstein v. Fiberonics Industries, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 43, 264 A.2d
262 (1970); Northern Fin. Corp. v. Chatwood Coffee Shop, Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. 674 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. 1967).
78. Farmers State Bank v. Otten, S.D.__, 204 N.W.2d 178 (1973) (repossession
of farm equipment prior to action on obligation and retention for 15 months before a sale
under judgment on obligation).
79. In Hutchinson v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 27 Cal. App. 3d 572, 103
Cal. Rptr. 816 (1972), debtors charged a secured party with "dumping large blocks" of a stock
"on the market at distress prices." The sale occurred after the market had rallied after a
severe decline. The court held, however, that the action of the secured party was commercially reasonable and affirmed a dismissal of the complaint.
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tained in subsection (3) of Section 9-504, were substantially revised
by the 1972 Official Text.
(a) When Notice Is Not Required
We begin with the instances in which notice is excused. It is
excused in the situations where the collateral is perishable, where
it threatens to decline substantially in value or where it is of a type
customarily sold on a recognized market. The rationale of excusing
notice in these situations is the absence of prejudice to the debtor,
and, in the first two cases, the desire to minimize delay in disposition by the secured party.
These rules must be invoked cautiously, however. In a recent
case, repossessed dairy cattle which "needed feed" but were reported to be in "good general condition" by a veterinarian who
tested them for disease two weeks after the debtor had requested
that the secured party retake the cattle were held not "perishable"
and not a threat "to decline speedily in value" within the meaning
of Section 9-504(3).80 As to collateral of a type "customarily sold on
a recognized market," registered investment securities are virtually
all that can flatly be said to qualify. Used automobiles, for example,
do not.8
(b)

Persons Entitled to Notice

The 1972 Official Text makes changes concerning the persons
entitled to notice of a proposed disposition under subsection (3) of
Section 9-504. The earlier text of that subsection required the secured party to give notice of an intended disposition to the debtor.
Except as to consumer goods, notice was also required to be given
to any person with a security interest in the collateral who had filed
a financing statement in the same state indexed in the debtor's
name, and, in addition, to any person-in or out of state, and
whether or not he had filed-"known by the [selling] secured party
to have a security interest in the collateral." Thus the earlier text
of subsection (3) required not only a new search by the selling secured party of the record of filed financing statements prior to a
disposition, but also a search for any other information that might
have come to his attention (by telephone, letter or otherwise) and
could serve to charge him with knowledge of the existence of another
80.
81.

United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Neb. 1971).
See cases cited at note 63, supra.
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secured party. These notice requirements could not be waived, and,
as we will shortly see, non-compliance was often a highly expensive
proposition for the selling secured party.
The 1972 amendments change much of this. Revised Section 9504(3) allows a debtor, after default, to waive or modify his right to
receive "reasonable notification" of the sale or other disposition to
be made. (In this connection, "debtor" includes a third party owner
who has furnished the collateral as well as the party owing the
secured obligation.)"2 Revised Section 9-504(3) also places on the
junior secured party who desires to receive notice of a disposition the
burden of informing the senior secured party of his interest,' 2 before
either the senior secured party sends notice to the debtor or the
debtor waives or renounces his own right to notification. The junior
secured party must now furnish the senior secured party with written notice of his claim of interest in the collateral before either of
those events occurs. Otherwise he is not entitled to notice of disposition-and revised Section 9-504(3) still provides that where the collateral is consumer goods, a junior secured party is not entitled to
that notice.83
The 1972 amendments thus reverse the burden of responsibility. Formerly the senior secured party was required to search for
others; now it is they who must advise the senior secured party of
their claim. This substantially aids efficient disposition under Section 9-504.
(c)

Time and Manner of Notice
Revised Section 9-504(3) still requires, however, that in most

82. Section 9-105(1)(d) so provides. See also 9-112 (when collateral is not owned by
debtor).
82.1 Both Revised 9-504(3) and Revised 9-505(2) assume that, since a junior secured
party will be aware of his junior status, it is the senior secured party who will be selling under
9-504(3) or proposing to retain the collateral under 9-505(2). In practice, this assumption will
virtually always be true. Even where it is not, the obligation of good faith imposed by 1-203
will normally protect the status of the senior secured party. Although the literal language of
9-505(2) can be read to raise a question concerning who would prevail if a junior secured party
unaware of his junior status made a proposal under that section and a senior secured party
failed to object, the chance of any question arising is almost nil. If the junior secured party
knows of the senior's existence (as is almost always the case), 1-203 dictates the result. At
least as between the competing secured parties, moreover, the problem cannot arise under 9504(3), since subsection (4) of that section provides that a sale thereunder discharges only
the security interest under which it is made and all subordinateliens.
83. The reasons for this are at least twofold. There is unlikely to be a junior security
interest in consumer goods. Even if there were, it is unlikely that any sale thereof on default
by a senior secured party would result in any realization for the junior secured party.
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cases the debtor must be given "reasonable notification" of the time
and place of any public sale or of the time after which a private sale
or any other disposition will be made. While many security agreements establish a five-day notice as a standard of reasonableness,
the validity of such a standard under present conditions may be
questionable in some cases. The advent of several Monday holidays
(with resultant three-day weekends), and current delays in the
mails, may not leave the debtor much, if any, time to act on a notice
of disposition sent five days in advance; in other words, such notice
may not be "reasonable." On the other hand, ten days' notice would
appear reasonable, as a rule of thumb, in most cases.
Although revised Section 9-504(3) requires a claim of interest
in the collateral by a competing secured party to be in writing, it
has no explicit parallel requirement for the notice of disposition
itself. One court has held that written notice of a disposition is not
required, despite the requirement of Section 9-504(3) that the notice
be "sent, ' 84 at least where the debtor admitted receipt of oral notice.85 Another court has opined to the contrary." Most prudent secured parties, however, will prefer to give written notice. Since receipt of a written notice sent by mail is not required, 87 the mere
sending of such notice may not necessarily avoid an issue of fact.
But it will certainly help in most cases; the use of registered mail
should resolve all but the most bizarre situations.
It should be noted that where a secured party learns that notice,
although sent, has not reached the debtor, he has been held to be
under a duty to take further steps to notify the debtor. 88
84. The term "send" is defined in 1-201(38) as follows:
"Send" in connection with any writing or notice means to deposit in the mail or
deliver for transmission by any other usual means of communication with postage or
cost of transmission provided for and properly addressed and in the case of an instrument to an address specified thereon or otherwise agreed, or if there be none to any
address reasonable under the circumstances The receipt of any writing or notice
within the time at which it would have arrived if properly sent has the effect of a
proper sending.
85. Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Alatzas, 264 Md. 571, 287 A.2d 261 (1972).
86. Foundation Discounts, Inc. v. Serna, 81 N.M. 474, 468 P.2d 875 (1970).
87. Hudspeth v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W.2d 191 (1964) (notice sent by certified
mail to the debtor, who resided on a rural mail route, was not received by him before the
sale because it was held for him at the post office, and he did not go into town to pick it up).
88. Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W. 2d 347
(1966).
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The Status of Purchasers at a Section 9-504 Disposition
What the Purchaser Gets

To facilitate attaining the secured party's objective of maximum realization from collateral after default-an objective shared
by any debtor facing a deficiency judgment-Section 9-504(4) of the
Code provides substantial protection for the purchaser of the collateral upon a disposition. A post-default disposition by a secured
party not only transfers to a purchaser for "value" (defined in Section 1-201(44)) all of the debtor's rights therein, but also discharges
the security interest of the seller and in addition any subordinate
security interest or lien-including (it is one of the few areas where
taxes are not as inevitable as death) a federal tax lien.8 9 Also included is a lien arising by reason of a levy on the collateral under a
judgment. This provision for a sale of collateral free of all liens
except those of senior parties makes a sale under Section 9-504 a
preferable means of realization, since a purchaser at a judicial sale
must often take under the rule of caveat emptor and may take
subject even to undisclosed liens. 0
A purchaser at an Article 9 disposition, moreover, takes free of
all such rights and interests even though the secured party fails to
comply with the requirements of the default sections (or with those
89. Reference is made, of course, to a junior lien, since the secured party presumably
verified his priority position before entering the transaction. A secured party who has reason
to believe that such a lien may exist may have a search made. If the search discloses a filed
federal tax lien, due notice to the government in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, § 7425(b) and (c)-i.e., at least 25 days in advance of disposition-will operate to
discharge the lien. W. PLUMB & L. Wright, Federal Tax Liens 236 (1967).
90. See Roberts v. Hughes, 81 Ill. 130 (1876); England v. Clark, 5 Ill. 487 (1843); and
Note, 20 MINN. L. REv. 805 (1940). This rule, whose operation may be harsh on occasion (as
the foregoing authorities demonstrate), still prevails in several states. See, e.g., Altec Lansing
v. Friedman Sound, Inc., 204 So. 2d 740 (Fla. App. 1967); First Nat'l Bank v. Sheriff of
Milwaukee County, 34 Wis. 2d 535, 149 N.W.2d 548 (1967). In Citizens Bank v. Perrin & Sons,
Inc., 253 Ark. 639, 488 S.W.2d 14 (1972), the court held that a sale of the collateral by a
judgment creditor of the debtor was, by reason of 9-311 (which changed prior Arkansas law),
not a conversion; the court reasoned that the sale had not adversely affected the position of
the secured party, who was free to pursue the collateral notwithstanding the judgment sale.
The court noted that the security interest was not discharged under 9-504(4). However, a
different rule prevails in Delaware. In Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg.
Co., - Del.__, 300 A.2d 8 (1972), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a
secured party's motion to set aside an execution sale of the collateral. It held that the longestablished Delaware policy (that chattels sold at an execution sale be sold free of all encumbrances so as to ensure the highest price and stimulate bidding) had not been changed
by 9-311. The sale stood, and the secured party was held entitled only to priority in the
proceeds. The court distinguished the Florida and Wisconsin cases cited above.
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of any judicial proceedings) if: (a) in the case of a public sale, the
purchaser has no knowledge of any defects in the sale and does not
buy in collusion with the secured party, other bidders or the person
conducting the sale, or (b) in the case of any other disposition, he
acts in good faith.9 ' In other words, a purchaser-even at a public
sale-is protected so long as he is not acting in bad faith; he is under
no duty to inquire into the circumstances of the sale.2
(b)

The Secured Party as a Purchaser

Section 9-503(3) permits a secured party to buy at any public
sale. It is often necessary for a secured party to buy, or at least to
bid and be prepared to buy, at a public sale, so that the collateral
is not sold for less than what the secured party regards as its fair
3
market value.1
The secured party may buy at a private sale if the collateral is
of a type (a) customarily sold in a recognized market, or (b) which
is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations. (If
registered securities were the collateral, for instance, and the secured party purchased them at a private sale at the price at which
such securities were concurrently sold on the New York Stock Exchange, the purchase would fit both exceptions.)
5.

Application of the Proceeds of Disposition

Section 9-504(1) delineates the order of distribution of the proceeds of a disposition. They are applied in the following order: (1)
91. See 9-504(4) and Comment 4 thereto. "Good faith," defined in 1-201(19), means
simply "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned"; the test would be met,
for example, by a purchaser who has negligently failed to discover the existence of other
liens or security interests. Query, however, if a purchaser who had deliberately avoided
inquiry could satisfy the good-faith requirement: 1-103 applies to the Code "the
[supplementary general] principles of law and equity," one of which is that-as the proverb
has it-there are none so blind as those who will not see.
92. 9-504, Comment 4. But see note 91 supra.
93. Public sales under the Code are usually a better means of realizing a fair value than
judicial sales, which are notoriously unsatisfactory in that regard for reasons set forth in note
90 supra. However, even at an Article 9 public sale, the secured party is often the only bidder.
Especially in that situation, and generally when the secured party buys, he should be careful
to observe all of the requirements of a "public sale" discussed in the text at notes 66-74 supra.
The protection afforded by the first sentence of 9-507(2) against a finding of commercial
unreasonableness based solely on inadequacy of selling price is far from absolute; and price
inadequacy, while not alone sufficient, is almost always the first step in inducing debtors as
well as courts to inquire vigorously into other possible defects in the sale. The requirement
of good faith (see note 91 supra) applies to the value a purchasing secured party puts on the
collateral-especially when he is the only bidder-as much as to any other aspect of the sale.
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to the secured party's expenses of realization; (2) to satisfaction of
the indebtedness secured by the security interest under which the
disposition occurs; and (3) to the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interests. Under Section 9-504(2),
the debtor is generally entitled to any remaining proceeds.
Realization expenses include "the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like
and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and not prohibited
by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred
by the secured party."94 It will be noted that the test is reasonableness.
The second order of application, the indebtedness secured by
the security interest under which the disposition is made, normally
presents little difficulty.
Third comes the holder of a subordinate security interest, who
stands next in line if any proceeds of a disposition remain after
satisfaction of realization expenses and of the indebtedness secured
by the security interest under which the disposition is made. However, Section 9-504 requires such persons to act affirmatively if they
wish a place in the queue. The participation of a junior secured
party in the proceeds of the disposition is conditioned upon the
receipt from him95 by the senior secured party, before distribution
of the proceeds is completed, of written notification of demand for
satisfaction of the junior security interest. Also, if the senior secured
party so requests, the holder of a junior secured interest must furnish reasonable proof of his interest. If he does not do so, the senior
secured party may ignore his demand. At a minimum, reasonable
proof would include a copy of the security agreement, signed by the
debtor.
If any surplus proceeds remain, an infrequent event even when
there is no subordinate security interest, the debtor is entitled to
them if the security interest secures an "indebtedness"; 9 6 in practice, that means anything other than a sale of accounts or chattel
94. The words "lease" and "leasing" were inserted in 9-504(1)(a) by the 1972 amendments solely as a matter of clarification.
95. Not merely his transmittal. This differs, for example, from the general rule concerning the selling secured party's notice of disposition (as to which see the text at note 87 supra).
The premise here, which accords with the 1972 amendments to 9-505, discussed below, is to
promote efficient dispositions.
96. 9-504(2). This subsection is identical to the last two sentences of 9-502(2).
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paper. If the proceeds of the disposition do not pay the indebtedness
under which the disposition is made, leaving a deficiency, the
debtor is liable for the deficiency unless the parties have otherwise
agreed. However, if the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is
liable for any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides. 7
C.

Acceptance of Collateral in Satisfaction of the Obligation

Section 9-505(2) establishes a procedure by which a secured
party in possession may propose to retain collateral in satisfaction
of the obligation. The antecedent for this provision was Section 23
of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act." As Official Comment 1 to
Section 9-505 points out, the provision was included in Article 9
because "[e]xperience has shown that the parties are frequently
better off without a resale of the collateral." One writer has noted
that Section 9-505(2) is often employed, for example, in cases of
disposition of unregistered securities whose public sale under Section 9-504(3) would be fraught with difficulty."
The 1972 amendments made changes in the text of Section 9505(2) which parallel those made in Section 9-504(3). These changes
are a substantial improvement over the earlier text. Before considering why, however, an exception to the basic rule of Section 9-505(2)
should be noted. The exception, made in subsection (1) of Section
9-505, provides that where a debtor has paid 60 percent of an obligation secured by consumer goods collateral, and has not signed after
default a statement renouncing or modifying his rights under Part
5 of Article 9, a secured party taking possession of the collateral
must dispose of it within 90 days under Section 9-504.
As noted earlier, there are apparently no reported decisions
concerning explicit proposals to accept collateral in satisfaction of
97. The term "contract rights" was deleted from 9-504(2) to conform to other 1972
amendments. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
98. Section 23 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act read quite simply:
Where there is no resale, the seller may retain the goods as his own property
without obligation to account to the buyer except as provided in Section 25, and the
buyer shall be discharged of all obligation.
Section 25 provided for recovery of damages for not less than one-quarter of the payments
made if the seller failed to comply with other provisions of the Act relating to redemption,
resale, application of proceeds, deficiency and rights of parties where there was no resale. See
3 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 501 (1968).
99. Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REv. 477, 521 (1973). In this connection see SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F. 2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Santa Monica
Bank v. SEC, 364 U.S. 819 (1960).
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a secured debt, although some decisions treat a disposition defective
under Section 9-504 as what amounts to an involuntary "proposal"
under Section 9-505(2). 100 Since (as we will see) revised Section 9505(2) removes many criticisms justly levelled at the earlier text,
however, more frequent use of it may be anticipated.
Many of the criticisms of the earlier text centered upon the
length of the waiting period between the making of a retention-insatisfaction proposal by a secured party and the final expiration of
the time within which the debtor (or competing secured parties)
might object. 1°1 Section 9-505(2) set that period at 30 days; but in
practice the period could more closely approximate 40 days, partly
because of lack of clarity in the language of the section. To begin
with, the 30-day period did not begin to run as to any potential
objector until his "receipt of . . . notification" of the proposal,
which might not occur until five days or more after notice of the
proposal had been sent. The only safe course for a secured party to
follow, therefore, was to transmit the notice by registered mail,
return receipt requested. Otherwise he had no way of knowing, and
might have a difficult time proving, when (or even whether) the
notice had been received and the running of the 30-day period
begun. A further complication occurred in cases involving multiple
debtors, or multiple secured parties claiming a security interest in
the collateral. In that situation, the secured party making the proposal had to date the running of the overall 30-day period from the
point at which notice was received by the last party entitled to it.
Compounding these problems as to the beginning of the period
was a similar problem as to when it actually ended. In practice, the
safest position for a secured party was to treat as timely any notice
of objection which had been deposited in the mails within 30 days
from the date the objector received notice of the proposal, as best
the proposing secured party could ascertain it. Again, the notice of
objection might not reach the secured party for several days-or at
02
all.
100.

See cases cited at note 77 supra.

101.

See, e.g., G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY

§§

44.3, at 1225

(1965); Kriple, Practice Commentary to § 9-505, 6212 McKINNEY's CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF
NEw YORK ANN. pt. 3 at 627 (1964).
102. Curiously, the former text, while requiring "receipt" of notification of a proposal,
contained no such requirement concerning a notice of objection. It simply directed that
objections be made "in writing within thirty days .
See G. GILMORE, supra note 101,
at 1224-25.
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The 1972 Official Text solves most of these problems. Section
9-505(2) now reduces the waiting period to a maximum of 21 days,
measured from dispatch of the notice (not receipt) to receipt (not
dispatch) of an objection. Ostensibly, the waiting period is reduced
by only nine days; in practice, the reduction is much more substantial and the time period much less subject to guesswork.
Further serious criticisms of former Section 9-505(2), paralleling to some degree those made of former Section 9-504(3),1°3 concerned the third parties entitled to notice of a retention-insatisfaction proposal. The former text required the proposing secured party to search the financing statement files under the
debtor's name in the appropriate state-even when the collateral
was instruments or securities, concerning which no search is necessary when a possessory security interest is taken"' 4-for the names
of possible competing secured parties, and to transmit notice of the
proposal to each of them. The former text also required a secured
party to maintain records even of telephone conversations or casual
encounters with persons claiming an interest in the collateral, since
notice was required to be given to any third party "known by the
secured party in possession to have an interest in" the collateral.
The 1972 Official Text also eliminates these criticisms and
shifts to the junior secured party the burden of giving notice of his
interest.' 5 First, the new text requires notice of a proposal to be
given to the debtor only if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his rights under Section 9-505(2). For
the first time, this language clearly permits a debtor to reduce or
waive the waiting period. Second, as before, in the case of consumer
goods collateral, no other notice need be given under any circumstances; but in all other cases notice need now be sent only to a
competing secured party from whom the secured party initiating the
proposal has received, before sending notice to the debtor (or before
the debtor's renunciation or modification of his rights, whichever
happens first), written notice of a claim of interest in the collateral.
These are the only persons entitled to notification of a proposal.
103. See the text following note 81 supra.
104. See 3-304(5) and 9-309, providing that holders in due course and bona fide purchasers of such collateral "take priority over an earlier security interest even though perfected"
and that filing under Article 9 is not notice to such parties. Under 1-201 (32) and (33),
"purchaser" includes a secured party.
105. See note 82.1 supra. In the nature of things, the junior secured party is more likely
to be aware of the senior secured party than the reverse.
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Finally, the 1972 Official Text also obviates the former possibility of a surprise objector. The earlier text required disposition under
Section 9-504 not only if an objection was received from "the debtor
or other person entitled to receive notification," but also if "any
other secured party"-whether or not he was entitled to notice, and
whether or not the proposing secured party knew of his existence-"object[ed] in writing within thirty days after the secured
party obtain[ed] possession" of the collateral. Thus a junior secured party with a claim to the collateral, who had not previously
made his existence known to the proposing secured party, but who
had learned of the proposal in time to object, was always a possibility. Under revised Section 9-505(2), however, only a person entitled
to receive notice (a comparatively narrow group, as indicated above)
may object to a proposal.
Under revised Section 9-505(2), in short, if the initiating secured party receives an objection within the 21-day period from a
person entitled to receive notification, he must dispose of the collateral under Section 9-504. Otherwise, his proposal is accepted and he
becomes the owner of the collateral. This is a major, and muchneeded, simplification of the former rules.
The 1972 Official Text does not specify the contents of a written
notice under Section 9-505(2), save that it must propose to retain
the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. Since a notice should,
as one writer has forcefully observed,,"e contain a "commercially
reasonable" amount of information, the prudent secured party
should include in his notice, in addition to the fact that he proposes
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation, a statement
that the obligation is in default and that he is in possession of the
collateral, a statement of the amount of the obligation and a description of the collateral.
V.

THE DEBTOR'S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

Section 9-506, unchanged by the 1972 amendments, is the
source of the debtor's right to redeem under Article 9. As with the
secured party's duty of disposition, flexibility attends the debtor's
right of redemption.
The period in which a debtor, or any other secured party, may
redeem (which may be shorter or longer than that provided under
106.

G.

GILMORE,

supra note 101, at 1224.
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pre-Code chattel security statutes) begins when the secured party
takes possession after a default (or, in the case of a possessory security interest, when the secured party declares a default). It continues until it is terminated by one of the following events: (a) disposition, or entry into a contract for disposition, of the collateral by the
secured party; (b) acceptance by the secured party of the collateral
in satisfaction of the debt, following a successful proposal under
Section 9-505(2); or (c) the signing by the debtor or a competing
secured party or both, after default, of a written agreement waiving
or releasing the right of redemption.10 7 Except in cases where notice
of disposition is excused,'"' the debtor necessarily has notice of the
likely termination of the time in which he may redeem.
The right to redeem is exercisable by the debtor or any competing secured party, and may be exercised as to part of the collateral
only-a point to be noted if the projected disposition of the collateral is to be by parcels rather than as a unit. 09 It may not be waived
except by an agreement in writing after default. The right is exercised by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral, as well as expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party
in retaking, holding and preparing the collateral for disposition and
in arranging for a sale, including (to the extent provided in the
security agreement and not prohibited by law) his reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses.
Although perhaps not often exercised, the debtor's right of redemption is zealously guarded by many courts. Denial of a deficiency judgment to a secured party who failed to give reasonable
notification of a disposition, for example, is rested by some courts
on the ground that the lack of notice hindered the debtor from
exercising his right of redemption."10 There are, however, limits. In
Old Colony Trust Co. v. PenroseIndustries Corp.,""a proceeding for
107. Where there are several debtors, or competing secured parties, the right of redemption is personal to each and must (if a waiver is desired) be waived by all; a waiver terminates
the right only as to the waiving party or parties.
108. See the text accompanying notes 80 and 81 supra.
109. See the Official Comment to 9-506, pointing out that the fact that a secured party
has "sold or contracted to sell part of the collateral would not affect the debtor's right ...
to redeem what was left." The comment adds that "in calculating the amount required to
be tendered the debtor would receive credit for net proceeds [i.e., after deducting the secured
party's realization expenses] of the collateral sold."
110. See, e.g., Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420
(1968), and compare Motor Contract Co. v. Sawyer, 123 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E.2d 282 (1971).
See also cases cited at note 114 infra.
111. 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968).
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a declaratory judgment that a proposed sale of collateral (consisting
of the common stock of a radio station) was commercially reasonable, the court held that a petition for redemption was untimely
when filed six months after the secured party had entered into a
contract for disposition of the collateral under Section 9-504.
VI.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATION OF THE

CODE DEFAULT PROVISIONS

Subsection (1) of Section 9-507 imposes sanctions-sometimes
stiff ones-for violations of the default provisions of Article 9. If it
is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance
with Part 5, Section 9-507(1) authorizes a court to order or restrain
disposition on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition
has occurred, the debtor or any person entitled to notice of disposition or whose security interest has been made known to the secured
party prior to the disposition may recover from the secured party
any loss caused by a failure to comply with the default provisions.
Note should be taken that any person whose security interest "was
made known to the secured party prior to the disposition," even if
not made known in accordance with revised Section 9-504(3) and
even though he would not be entitled to a notice of disposition, may
nevertheless assert that a proposed disposition was not commer2
cially reasonable and recover damages.1
Of major significance in the present climate of judicial and
legislative expansion of consumer rights is the final sentence of Section 9-507(1), which provides a minimum recovery by the debtor,
where consumer goods are involved, consisting of the entire finance
charge" 3 plus 10 percent of the principal amount of the debt or 10
percent of the cash price. This minimum penalty affords consumer
debtors a remedy more effective in dollar terms than one limited to
actual loss, as is the case with non-consumer goods.
The interrelationship between the penalty provisions of Section
112. Section 9-507 was left unchanged by the 1972 amendments. Language similar to
the quoted language in the footnoted sentence was removed from both 9-504(3) and 9-505(2),
and the requirement was imposed in both subsections, as earlier discussed, that a junior
secured party notify the senior security party of his existence by written notice of a claim of
interest in order to be entitled to notification of a disposition under 9-504(3) or of a proposal
to accept the collateral in satisfaction of the debt under 9-505(2).
113. The Code terms are "credit service charge" and "time price differential", both of
which are included in what is fast becoming (under the impetus of the Truth in Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1968)) the more commonly used term "finance charge."
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9-507(1) and the right of a secured party to a deficiency judgment
under Section 9-504(2), where the secured party has not complied
with Part 5, has produced a divergence of views among courts which
have considered the problem. One line of decisions holds that the
failure of a secured party to comply with the notification requirements of Section 9-504(3) flatly bars him from recovering any deficiency."t 4 Another line of decisions dealing with the same situation
holds that the failure of the secured party to give notice of a disposition does not ipso facto bar a deficiency judgment, and that a
debtor's claim for damages under Section 9-507(1) may be offset
against the amount of the deficiency to which the secured party
would otherwise be entitled."'
Skeels v. Universal CIT Credit Corp."' began the first line of
decisions, a line which severely penalizes a secured party. The rationale of Skeels and its progeny is at least two-fold-first, that the
secured party, by failing to give notice, has precluded the debtor
from exercising his right of redemption, and second, that the debtor
is not limited to the remedies provided in Section 9-507(1). The bar
to a deficiency thus becomes a judicially created penalty in addition
to the penalty contained in Section 9-507(1). The result seems questionable.
Norton v. National Bank of Commerce,"7 the forerunner of the
second line of decisions, reasons that the damage provisions of Sec114. Skeels v. Universal CIT Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), vacated
on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d
999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972); Leasco Data Process Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc.
2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Aimonetto v. Keepes,
- Wyo. __,
501 P.2d
1017 (1972). Arguably Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson, 133 Ill. App. 2d 717, 271 N.E.2d 404 (1971),
belongs to this line; however, see Tauber v. Johnson, 8 Ill. App. 3d 789, 291 N.E.2d 180 (1972).
In New York, previous decisions of the New York courts under the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act influenced the result. However, previous New Jersey decisions under that Act in accord
with New York cases thereunder did not yield the same result; see Conti Causeway Ford v.
Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971).
115. Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969); Norton v. National
Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 131, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966); Universal CIT Credit Corp. v. Pone,
248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970); Community Management Ass'n v. Tousely, Colo.
App.
-, 505 P.2d 1314 (1973); Tauber v. Johnson, 8 Ill. App. 3d 789, 291 N.E.2d 180
(1972); Abbott Motors, Inc. v. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. 35, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 788 (1964); T & W
Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969); Conti
Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super.
521, 288 A.2d 872 (1972); Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415
S.W. 2d 347 (1966); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
116. 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.
1964).
117. 240 Ark. 131, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
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tion 9-507 are designed to enable a debtor to recover at a minimum
the difference between the proceeds of an improperly held sale of
collateral and the larger amount that a properly held sale would
have produced. If those damages are off-set against the creditor's
deficiency judgment, the effect will be to reduce that judgment to
the amount which the creditor would have recovered had he complied with the Article 9 default provisions. The end result is the
same as though the creditor had held a proper sale in the first
instance.
In Norton, the collateral was a used car whose status as consumer goods was left open. The court held that there was no "recognized market" for used cars and that the secured party had improperly failed to give the debtor notice of the disposition, so that the
debtor had a right to damages as provided in Section 9-507. However, the lack of proper notice and the absence of a recognized
market for the collateral meant that the debtor, through no fault of
his own, was unable to show what a commercially reasonable sale
would have brought, and therefore could not prove the amount of
his damages. The court resolved that dilemma by announcing that
in such cases it would presume that the collateral was worth the
amount of the debt, and would place the burden upon the creditor
to show otherwise. Thus the creditor would forfeit his deficiency
judgment unless he could prove that a commercially reasonable sale
of the car would have yielded less than the amount of the debt. On
the other hand, such proof would also establish the missing element
in the debtor's damage claim, paving the way for the desired offset
of damages against the creditor's deficiency claim.
While almost all decisions in the Norton line have involved
deficiency actions by secured parties who failed to give notice of the
disposition, it seems reasonably clear that those courts would apply
the same logic to an action initiated by a debtor asserting that
notice of disposition of the collateral was not sent and that a commercially reasonable disposition would have produced a surplus, or
to cases involving Part 5 violations other than lack of notice. In
other words, the burden of proof that the disposition was commercially reasonable would still be upon the secured party. Indeed, one
court following the Norton view has placed that burden upon a
secured party asserting a deficiency against a debtor who had received notice of, but did not attend, a sale described as "public.""' 8
118.

Massey-Ferguson Fin. Corp. v. Hamlin, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 142 (Tenn. App. 1971).
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And the Norton court itself has reached the same result in a deficiency action by a secdred party who gave notice of the disposition,
but violated Section 9-504(3) by purchasing at what was a private
sale."'
While presently the two lines of cases are about equal in number, only three of the decisions in both lines are by courts of last
resort; and it is difficult to prognosticate which approach will ultimately prevail-even in some of the jurisdictions in which one view
or the other has so far found favor. Nor can one presently anticipate
what, if any, action the Permanent Editorial Board will take concerning amendment of the Code in view of these two divergent views
and the resulting non-uniform treatment of Section 9-507. The
Board may take the view, as the draftsmen of the Code did with
some of its provisions, that the question is one on which uniformity
is not essential.
One other question concerning the effect of noncompliance with
the default provisions of the Code has arisen and been decided.
Suppose a secured party after default repossesses a consumer
debtor's car on which the consumer debtor has paid in excess of the
60 percent required by Section 9-505(1), but fails to sell the car until
more than 90 days after repossession and also fails to give the debtor
notice of the disposition. The secured party has thereby violated
both Section 9-504(3) and Section 9-505(1). May a debtor therefore
recover a double penalty under Section 9-507(1)? The only court
which appears to have considered the matter has decided that he
may not.'2 0
VII.

MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL RULES DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OR
USE OF THE COLLATERAL

Article 9 sets forth some special disposition rules (unchanged
by the 1972 amendments) which depend on the nature or use of
certain types of collateral: consumer goods, equipment, documents
of title and security agreements involving both personal property
and real estate. A brief discussion of those rules, which have apparently presented no difficult problems (at least from the standpoint
of reported litigation), is in order.
Note has already been taken of the special rules concerning
119.
120.

Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales, Inc., 248 Ark. 236, 451 S.W.2d 199 (1970).
Crosby v. Basin Motor Co., 83 N.M. 77, 488 P.2d 127 (1971).
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consumer goods-compulsory disposition in the 60 percent payment
situation under Section 9-505(1), and the limited notice requirements on disposition under Section 9-504(3) and on a proposal to
accept the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation under Section
9-505(2).
Special provisions particularly useful in the case of commercial
collateral are found in Section 9-503, whose repossession self-help
provisions have already been discussed. For example, a secured
party may render equipment unusable without removing it from the
debtor's premises, and may dispose of it on the debtor's premises
under Section 9-504. In combination, these two provisions are especially valuable where the collateral is heavy equipment. Disposition
expenses are reduced, and realization proceeds accordingly increased, when the secured party can take advantage of these provisions.
Section 9-503 also grants another important right to the secured
party. If the security agreement so provides, the secured party may
require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available
to the secured party, at a place reasonably convenient to both parties, as designated by the secured party. Such a provision in a security agreement would appear particularly useful in cases of inventory and equipment collateral, as well as farm products (particularly in this age of the corporate and sometimes far-flung farmer).
In Clark Equipment Co. v. Armstrong Equipment Co.,' 2 ' the Fifth
Circuit held such a provision in a security agreement (which covered
road-building equipment located in five adjoining southern states)
enforceable by mandatory injunction. The court observed that the
injunctive relief granted by the lower court was "the only appropriate remedy for the enforcement of the terms of the agreement in
22
view of the location of the property in five different states.'"
If the collateral is documents, subsection (1) of Section 9-501
provides that the secured party may proceed either as to the documents or as to the goods covered thereby. This accords the secured
party the option of disposing directly of the documents as collateral,
or of using the documents to obtain possession of the underlying
121. 431 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971).
122. 431 F.2d at 57. The trial court directed the debtor to assemble the equipment and
the secured party to sell the collateral and account for the proceeds, requiring a $1,000,000
bond, which was posted by the secured party. The court of appeals noted that the only issue
before it was the injunction.
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goods and then proceeding as to the goods. (Under Section 7-403(3),
of course, the secured party cannot proceed as to the goods without
surrendering the documents to the bailee having possession of the
goods.)
Finally, where the security agreement covers both real and personal property, subsection (4) of Section 9-501 allows the secured
party another option: He may either proceed against the personal
property under the default sections of Article 9, or proceed as to
both types of property in accordance with his rights and remedies
in respect to the real property. In the event he chooses the latter
course, he need have no concern with compliance with the default
sections, since non-Code law will apply.
VIII.

THE ALTERNATIVE ROUTE: JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Suppose that a secured party, for whatever reason, cannot or
does not wish to dispose of collateral under Part 5 of Article 9.
Section 9-501(1) expressly authorizes him to reduce his claim to
judgment and to foreclose or otherwise enforce his security interest
by "any available judicial procedures"; the section simply refers the
secured party to non-Code law to determine the availability, requirements and results of any such procedure.'23
Of course, one method by which a secured party may proceed
judicially is to reduce his claim against the debtor to judgment and
then to obtain a lien on the collateral (and any other available
property of the debtor) by virtue of an execution based on the judgment. When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment,
Section 9-501(5) conveniently provides that any execution lien on
the collateral "shall relate back to the date of the perfection of the
security interest in such collateral."' 24 Accordingly, a secured party
who files an action on his claim need not ordinarily be concerned
about the effect on his priority status (as otherwise determined
under Part 3 of Article 9) of the time required to pursue the judicial
remedies to a conclusion. A secured party in that situation should
note, however, that if he repossesses the collateral and also proceeds
to reduce his claim to judgment (whether concurrently or not) and
if the repossession involves taking possession of collateral in any way
123. Compare 1-103, providing that "the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement [the Code] provisions."
124. This subsection reaches the same result as reached in In re Adrian Research &
Chem. Co., 269 F.2d 734 (3d Cir. 1959).
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other than pursuant to an execution issued following a judgment,
his repossession and disposition of the collateral will be subject to
the requirements of Part 5 of Article 9.1 This is true because Article
9 exempts from the default provisions only seizures of collateral
made pursuant to - not merely collateral to or concurrent with judicial proceedings.
Subsection (5) of Section 9-501 also provides that a judicial sale
pursuant to a post-judgment execution is a foreclosure of the security interest by judicial procedure within the meaning of that
subsection. Thus the secured party may purchase the collateral at
such a sale without regard to any of the normal requirements of
Article 9, such as notice of disposition and standards of commercial
reasonableness.' 26 As noted earlier, however, judicial sales have the
drawback of being subject to the doctrine of caveat emptor. "
Where the debtor is bankrupt, of course, the secured party has
no choice; he must proceed judicially. If he wishes, he may consent
to the sale of the collateral by the trustee in bankruptcy, with his
lien attaching to the proceeds. Or he may file a petition to reclaim
the collateral, if he wishes to dispose of it himself.'28 Whether such
a petition is granted will depend on equitable considerations and the
substance of the transaction, rather than on the form of the security
agreement or on a determination-generally irrelevant under Article 9-of who had title.' 9 Even if the petition is denied, it is believed
125. Bradford v. Lindsey Chevrolet Co., 117 Ga. App. 781, 161 S.E.2d 904 (1968);
Farmers State Bank v. Otter, - S.D. , 204 N.W.2d 178 (1973).
126. At least where he leaves the collateral in the debtor's possession; see text at note
125 supra.
127. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
128. He has a third option in such cases; he may elect to file a proof of claim in the
bankruptcy proceeding for the entire debt due him, or merely for the deficiency remaining
after the sale or reclamation of the collateral. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRuPrcY 1 57.07 n.19.
(14th ed. 1971).
129. See In re Yale Express System, Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966), a reorganization
proceeding in which the creditor held a chattel mortgage lien on trucks in the debtor's
possession. Distinguishing such a lien from a conditional sale, the district court held that title
to the trucks was in the debtor in such a lien situation, rather than in the creditor (as would
have been the case under a conditional sale). Reasoning that the fundamental issue on a
reclamation petition is who owns the property in question, the district court concluded that
since title to the property was in the debtor, the petition to reclaim should be denied. The
Second Circuit reversed. It noted that Article 9 had dispensed with the technicalities of title
(see 9-202), and concluded that where a petition to reclaim is brought by virtue of secured
creditor status, a bankruptcy court should likewise not be controlled by the question of'title.
Instead, equitable considerations and the substance of the transaction should govern in
determining whether the reclamation petition should be granted.
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that, in a rehabilitation proceeding, the bankruptcy court may exercise its equitable powers to require rental payments to a secured
30
creditor for the use of the collateral.'
CONCLUSION

On balance, the Article 9 default provisions seem to be working
reasonably well. As indicated previously, the amendments to those
provisions made by the 1972 Official Text should make them work
even better.
Prognostication of the future course of the judicial developments discussed above, however, is not now possible. Those developments have threatened, if not seriously cramped, both the standard "self-help" repossession and disposition procedure established
by Sections 9-503 and 9-504 and also the alternative route of foreclosure and disposition through judicial proceedings. And the significance of the current dispute over the nature of the debtor's remedies
for violation of the default requirements of Article 9 by a secured
party should not be minimized. On the whole, however, it is believed that the quiet revolution worked by Article 9 in the previously
complex, obscure and often contradictory pattern of default enforcement of security interests has taken root and will not be easily
dislodged. Indeed, it can fairly be said that the current controversies
noted in this article indicate that the provisions of Part 5 of Article
9 have taken hold so completely as no longer to be relegated to
technical obscurity, as not infrequently occurred with similar preCode chattel security provisions. Much of the credit for that development must go to the flexibility of the Code provisions.
Where the Uniform Commercial Code is not applicable, however, questions of title and
of the form of the security agreement may still be determinative. See, e.g., In re Spanish
Language Television, Inc., 456 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1972) (the denial of a reclamation petition
on behalf of a conditional seller was reversed where, under the applicable Uniform Conditional Sales Act, title was reserved in the seller).
130. Although "in the past bankruptcy courts have been reluctant to award such rental
payments[,J the considerations underlying this reluctance may well be different now in light
of our holding that a creditor cannot assure himself the right to reclaim merely by labeling
his security device a conditional sales contract." In re Yale Express System, Inc., 370 F.2d
433, 439 (1966) (dictum). However, the Second Circuit refused to impose this remedy on a
latter appeal in the same case; it agreed with the district court's conclusion that to grant such
rent as relief would seriously impair the progress of the Chapter 10 reorganization, since all
creditors would have been entitled to such rent. 384 F.2d 990 (1967).
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